Abstract. In this work we represent the Optimal Stable Marriage problem as a Soft Constraint Satisfaction Problem. In addition, we extend this problem from couples of individuals to coalitions of generic agents, in order to define new coalition-formation principles and stability conditions. In the coalition case, we suppose the preference value as a trust score, since trust can describe the belief of a node in the capabilities of another node, in its honesty and reliability. Semiring-based soft constraints represent a general and expressive framework that is able to deal with distinct concepts of optimality by only changing the related c-semiring structure, instead of using different ad-hoc algorithms. At last, we propose an implementation of the classical OSM problem using integer linear programming tools.
Introduction
The Stable Marriage (SM) problem [13, 19] and its many variants [16] have been widely studied in the literature, because of the inherent appeal of the problem and its important practical applications. A classical instance of the problem comprises a bipartite set of n men and n women, and each person has a preference list in which they rank all members of the opposite sex in a strict total order. Then, a match MT is simply a bijection between men and women. A man m i and a woman w j form a blocking pair for MT if m i prefers w j to his partner in MT and w j prefers m i to her partner in MT. A matching that involves no blocking pair is said to be stable, otherwise the matching is unstable. Even though the SM problem has its roots as a combinatorial problem, it has also been studied in game theory, economics and in operations research [10] .
However, in this paper we mainly concentrate on its optimization version, the Optimal Stable Marriage (OSM) problem [16, 19] , which tries to find a match that is not only stable, but also "good" according to some criterion based on the preferences of all the individuals. Classical solutions deal instead only with men-optimal (or women-optimal) marriages, in which every man (woman), gets his (her) best possible partner.
We propose soft constraints as a very expressive framework where it is possible to cast different kinds of optimization criteria by only modifying the csemiring [1, 4] structure on which the corresponding Soft Constraint Satisfaction Problem (SCSP) [1] is based. In this sense, soft constraints prove to be a more general solving framework with respect to the other ad-hoc algorithms presented in literature for each different optimization problem [16] . In fact, we can also deal with problem extensions such as incomplete preference lists and ties in the same list. Therefore, in this paper we build a bridge between the OSM problems and soft constraint satisfaction, as previously done between SM and classic constraint satisfaction [10, 23] . Moreover, we use integer linear programming (ILP) as a general method to solve these problems. The classical SM problem (thus, the non-optimal version of the problem) has been already studied and solved by using crisp constraints in [10, 23] . In [10] the authors present two different encodings of an instance of SM as an instance of a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). Moreover, they show that arc consistency propagation achieves the same results as the classical Extended Gale/Shapley (EGS) algorithm, thus easily deriving the men/women-optimal solution [10] .
The second main result provided in the paper relates to extending the stable marriage definition from pairs of individuals to coalitions of agents. A coalition can be defined as a temporary alliance among agents, during which they cooperate in joint action for a common task [14] . Moreover, we use trust scores instead of plain preferences in order to evaluate the relationships among agents. Therefore, the notion of SM stability is translated to coalitions, and the problem is still solved by exploiting the optimization point of view: the final set of coalitions is stable and is the most trustworthy with respect to the used trust metric, represented by a c-semiring [2, 6, 22] . Even for this coalition extension we use soft constraints to naturally model the problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the background on soft constraints, while Section 3 does the same for the OSM problem. In Section 4 we represent the OSM problem with soft constraints and we solve it with ILP. Section 5 extends the OSM problem to coalitions, still representing the problem with soft constraints. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions and directions for future work.
Soft Constraints
A c-semiring [1, 4] S (or simply semiring in the following) is a tuple A, +, ×, 0, 1 where A is a set with two special elements (0, 1 ∈ A) and with two operations + and × that satisfy certain properties: + is defined over (possibly infinite) sets of elements of A and thus is commutative, associative, idempotent, it is closed and 0 is its unit element and 1 is its absorbing element; × is closed, associative, commutative, distributes over +, 1 is its unit element, and 0 is its absorbing element (for the exhaustive definition, please refer to [4] ). The + operation defines a partial order ≤ S over A such that a ≤ S b iff a + b = b; we say that a ≤ S b if b represents a value better than a. Other properties related to the two operations are that + and × are monotone on ≤ S , 0 is its minimum and 1 its maximum, A, ≤ S is a complete lattice and + is its lub. Finally, if × is idempotent, then + distributes over ×, A, ≤ S is a complete distributive lattice and × its glb.
A soft constraint [1, 4] may be seen as a constraint where each instantiation of its variables has an associated preference. Given S = A, +, ×, 0, 1 and an ordered set of variables V over a finite domain D, a soft constraint is a function which, given an assignment η : V → D of the variables, returns a value of the semiring. Using this notation C = η → A is the set of all possible constraints that can be built starting from S, D and V. Any function in C involves all the variables in V, but we impose that it depends on the assignment of only a finite subset of them. So, for instance, a binary constraint c x,y over variables x and y, is a function c x,y : V → D → A, but it depends only on the assignment of variables {x, y} ⊆ V (the support of the constraint, or scope). Note that cη[v := d 1 ] means cη where η is η modified with the assignment v := d 1 . Note also that cη is the application of a constraint function c :
what we obtain, is a semiring value cη = a.0 and1 respectively represent the constraint functions associating 0 and 1 to all assignments of domain values; in general, theā function returns the semiring value a.
Given the set C, the combination function ⊗ : C × C → C is defined as (c 1 ⊗ c 2 )η = c 1 η × c 2 η (see also [1, 4] ). Informally, performing the ⊗ or between two constraints means building a new constraint whose support involves all the variables of the original ones, and which associates with each tuple of domain values for such variables a semiring element which is obtained by multiplying the elements associated by the original constraints to the appropriate sub-tuples. The partial order ≤ S over C can be easily extended among constraints by defining c 1 c 2 ⇐⇒ c 1 η ≤ c 2 η. Consider the set C and the partial order . Then an entailment relation ⊆ ℘(C) × C is defined such that for each C ∈ ℘(C) and c ∈ C, we have C c ⇐⇒ C c (see also [1] ). Given a constraint c ∈ C and a variable v ∈ V, the projection [1, 3, 4] 
Informally, projecting means eliminating some variables from the support.
A SCSP [1] defined as P = C, con (C is the set of constraints and con ⊆ V, i.e. a subset the problem variables). A problem P is α-consistent if blevel(P) = α [1]; P is instead simply "consistent" iff there exists α > S 0 such that P is α-consistent [1] . P is inconsistent if it is not consistent. The best level of consistency notion defined as blevel(P) = Sol(P) ⇓ ∅ , where Sol(P) = ( C) ⇓ con [1] . the opposite sex are ranked in a strict total order. All men and women must be matched together in a couple such that no element x of couple a prefers an element y of different couple b that also prefers x (i.e. the stability condition of the pairing). If such an (x, y) exists in the match, then it is defined as blocking; a match is stable if no blocking pairs exist.
The problem was first studied by Gale and Shapley [9] . They showed that there always exists at least a stable matching in any instance and they also proposed a O(n 2 )-time algorithm to find one, i.e. the so-called Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm. An extended version of the GS algorithm, i.e. the EGS algorithm [13] , avoids some unnecessary steps by deleting from the preference lists certain (man, woman) pairs that cannot belong to a stable matching. Notice that, in the man-oriented version of the EGS algorithm, each man has the best partner (according to his ranking) that he could obtain, whilst each woman has the worst partner that she can accept. Similar considerations hold for the woman-oriented version of EGS, where men have the worst possible partner.
For this reason, the classical problem has been extended [9] in order to find a SM under a more equitable measure of optimality, thus obtaining an Optimal SM problem [12, 15, 16, 19] . For example, in [15] the authors maximize the total satisfaction in a SM by simply summing together the preferences of both men, p M (m i , w j ), and women, p W (m i , w i ), in the SM given by MT = {(m i , w j ), . . . , (m k , w z )}. This sum needs to be minimized since p M (m i , w j ) represents the rank of w j in m i 's list of preferences, where a low rank position stands for a higher preference, i.e. 1 belongs to the most preferred partner; similar considerations hold for the preferences of women, p W (m i , w j ), which represents the rank of m i in w i 's list of preferences. Therefore, we need to minimize this egalitarian cost [15] :
This optimization problem was originally posed by Knuth [15] . Other optimization criteria are represented by minimizing the regret cost [12] as in (2): min max
or by minimizing the sex-equalness cost [17] as in (3):
Even though the number of stable matchings for one instance grows exponentially in general [16] , (1) and (2) have been already solved in polynomial time using ad-hoc algorithms such as [15] and [12] , respectively, by exploiting a lattice structure that condenses the information about all matchings. On the contrary, (3) is an NP-hard problem for which only approximation algorithms have been given [17] .
In the following, we consider preference as a more general weight, taken from a semiring, instead of a position in the preference's list of an individual; thus, we suppose to have weighted preference lists [15] . A different but compatible, with respect to OSM, variant of the SM problem allows incomplete preference's lists, i.e. the SM with incomplete lists (SMI), if a person can exclude a partner whom she/he does not want to be matched with [16] . Another extension is represented by preference lists that allow ties, i.e. in which it is possible to express the same preference for more than one possible partner: the problem is usually named as SM with ties, i.e. SMT [16] . In this case, three stability notions can be proposed [16] :
-Given any two couples (m i , w j ) and (m k , w z ), in a super stable match a pair
Hence, if a match is super stable then it is strongly stable, and if it is strongly stable then it is weakly stable [16] . Allowing ties in preferences means that objectives (1), (2) and (3) above become hard even to approximate [16] . By joining together these two extensions, we obtain the SMTI problem: SM with Ties and Incomplete lists [16] . The preferences of men and women can be represented with two matrices M and W, respectively, as in Figure 2 . A subset of these two matrices (for sake of simplicity) is represented in Figure 1 as a bipartite graph, where only the preferences of m 1 , m 2 , w 1 and w 2 are shown. For instance, the match {(m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 )} is not stable since (m 1 , w 1 ) is a blocking pair: w 1 ) , i.e. 1 < 4 ∧ 1 < 4 (here we use < instead of > because lower values are preferred).
Representing the OSM Problem with Soft Constraints
In order to define an encoding of an OSM instance I as a SCSP instance P (see Section 2), we introduce the set V of variables: m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n corresponding to men, and w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n corresponding to women. The domain D of m i or w j is [1, n] . For each i, j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n), then η : V → D (as defined in Section 2) denotes the value of variable m i and w j respectively, i.e., the partner associated with the match. For example, η(m 1 ) = 3 means that m 1 is matched with w 3 .
We need three different set of soft constraints to describe an OSM problem, according to each of the relationships we need to represent: 
We need n 2 marriage constraints, one for each possible man-woman couple. 
, where S represents the chosen semiring (see Section 2) . In previous stability constraint definition we use < S because we are looking for a weakly stable marriage (see Section 3). For super and strong stabilities (see Section 3) we should instead define the stability constraints by using ≤ S . Therefore, we need n 4 stability constraints of this kind.
Given this encoding, the set of consistent solutions of P is equivalent to the set of solutions of I (i.e. an OSM problem instance). Therefore, unsatisfying the marriage or stability constraints makes P inconsistent (see Section 2). By using this formalization it is now possible to easily maximize the global satisfaction of all the couples, and thus finding a solution for the OSM problem. In practice it is possible to obtain the best possible solution of the SCSP problem being considered by exploiting the properties of the chosen semiring operators, i.e. + and ×. For example, we could consider the preference as a cost, and the cost of the complete match could be obtained by summing together the costs of all the found (non-blocking) pairs. In this case, and if we want to minimize the cost of the n marriages, we can use the Weighted semiring [1, 4] , i.e. R + , min,+, +∞, 0 (+ is the arithmetic sum). Therefore, what we solve is exactly Objective (1) in Section 3.
Otherwise, we could use the Fuzzy semiring [0, 1], max, min, 0, 1 [1, 4] to maximize the "happiness" of the least sympathetic couple overall: the fuzzy values in the interval [0, 1] represent an "happiness degree" of the marriage relationships and are aggregated with min, but preferred with max. Again, what we solve with this semiring is exactly Objective (2) in Section 3, if we consider the ordering of the preferences as inverted (i.e. a high preference is better than a lower one); this is the reason why we use max − min instead of min − max.
Finally, as an example on the expressiveness of our framework, we can use the Probabilistic semiring [0, 1], max,×, 0, 1 [1, 4] (× is the arithmetic multiplication) in order to maximize the probability that the obtained couples will not split. It is also possible to maximize the "happiness" of a fixed man or woman by setting to 1 the other preferences.
Moreover, we can represent the SMI extension reported in Section 3 by simply declaring a preference constraint with value corresponding to 0: c m i (m i = j) = 0 if m i has not expressed a preference for w j . Further on, by having the same value in the same preference list, i.e. c m i (m i = j) = a and c m i (m i = z) = a, we can represent the SMT problem defined in Section 3. In Section 4.1 we consider and solve the most general problem among those presented in Section 3, i.e. the Optimal SMTI (OSMTI).
Notice that such semiring structures allows us to consider also the preferences of men and women being partially ordered (see Section 2), which is clearly more generic and expressive with respect to the total ordering of the classical problem: Bob could love/like Alice and Chandra more than Drew, but he could not relate the first two girls with each other.
Specifying and Instance of the OSM Problem
In this section we solve the soft constraint formalization of the OSMTI problem given with preference, marriage and stability constraints. To achieve this goal, we represent and solve it as an ILP by using AMPL [8] . AMPL is a modeling language for mathematical programming with a very general and expressive syntax. It covers a variety of types and operations for the definition of indexing sets, as well as a range of logical expressions. The solution can be obtained with different solvers which can interface to AMPL; for our example we use CPLEX 7 . The soft constraints can be represented with AMPL statements. The obtained SCSP can be clearly solved also with other techniques as branch-andbound [20] , or branch-and-bound and Symmetry Breaking via Dominance Detection (SBDD) [5] ; however, the ILP solver represents a completely new approach with respect to SCSP, and provides a bridge between the two fields.
We consider an instantiation of the (1) problem in Section 3, and therefore the adopted semiring is R + , min,+, +∞, 0 , even if, as said before, we can also solve other criteria by changing the semiring. The two matrices M and W in Figure 2 respectively represent the preference values of n = 6 men (MEN = {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 , m 5 , m 6 }) and n = 6 women (WOMEN = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , w 5 , w 6 }) taken from the Weighted semiring set. Notice that both M and W are displayed Figure 2 with men on rows and women on columns, in order to improve the readibility when comparing the two matrices. The lists of preferences of men are represented by the rows of M, and the preferences of women are instead the columns of W. Since we want to deal with incomplete lists, the preference value corresponds to the bottom element of the semiring (in Weighted semiring, it is ∞) if that preference has not been expressed; Inf in Figure 2 is a shortcut for a very large value that we can consider as the infinite value (e.g. 10000). For example, in Notice that this problem could have no solution in general due to the fact that the preference lists are incomplete and we want to find a perfect match (n pairs). Moreover, since we have ties and we require a weakly stable matching, the problem is NP-hard [16] .
A Formalization as an Integer Linear Program
With AMPL we need to create two files storing the data of the problem (Figure 2 ) and its model (Figure 3) . The Marriage variable in Figure 3 corresponds to the couples representing the best stable marriage, while the EgalitarianCost is exactly computed as for Objective (1) in Section 3 and the goal is to minimize it. Notice that by changing the mathematical operators of the OBJECTIVE in Figure 3 , it is possible to solve also Objectives (2) and (3) w 6 ), (m 6 , w 3 )}. The egalitarian costs for these three matches are respectively ec(SM 1 ) = 32, ec(SM 2 ) = 30 and ec(SM 3 ) = 29, which is also the result of the program in Figure 3 since it corresponds to the lowest possible cost. The SM 3 solution is also represented in Figure 4 as a bipartite graph, where the man/woman preferences within the same couple are added on the same edge, i.e. the cost of the edge (m 1 ,
(the values in the matrices of Figure 2 ).
Multi-Agent Systems and the Stable Marriage of Coalitions
Cooperating groups, referred to as coalitions, have been thoroughly investigated in artificial intelligence and game theory and have proved to be useful in both real-world economic scenarios and multi-agent systems [14] . Coalitions, in general, are task-directed and short-lived, but last longer than team organization [14] (for example) and in some cases they have a long lifetime once created [11] . Given the population of entities E, the problem of coalition forma- tion consists in selecting the appropriate partition of E, P = {C 1 , . . . , C n } (|P| = |A| if each entity forms a coalition on its own), such that ∀C i ∈ P, C i ⊆ E and C i ∩ C j = ∅, if i j. P maximizes the utility (utility against costs) that each coalition can achieve in the environment. Therefore, agents group together because utility can be gained by working in groups, but this growth is somewhat limited by the costs associated with forming and maintaining such a structure. Cooperation involves a degree of risk arising from the uncertainties of interacting with autonomous self-interested agents. Trust [18] describes a node's belief in another node's capabilities, honesty and reliability based on its own direct experiences. Therefore trust metrics have been already adopted to perceive this risk, by estimating how likely other agents are to fulfill their cooperative commitments [7, 11] . Since trust is usually associated with a specific scope [18] , we suppose that this scope concerns the task that the coalition must face after its formation; for example, in electronic marketplaces the agents in the same coalition agree with a specific discount for each transaction executed [7, 21] . Clearly, an entity can also trust itself in achieving the task, and can form a singleton coalition.
Defining the Stable Marriage for Coalitions
In an individual-oriented approach an agent prefers to be in the same coalition with the agent with whom it has the best relationship [7] . In socially-oriented classification the agent instead prefers the coalition in which it has most summative trust [7] . In this Section we would like to rephrase the classical notion of stability in SM problems (presented in Section 3) as coalition formation cri- teria. Moreover, instead of a preference (as in Section 3), we need to consider a trust relationship between two entities, which, inherently expresses a preference in some sense. To do so, in Definition 1 we formalize how to compute the trustworthiness of a whole coalition:
Definition 1 (Trustworthiness of a Coalition). Given a coalition C of agents defined by the set {x 1 , . . . , x n } and a trust function t defined on ordered pairs (i.e. t(x i , x y ) is the trust score that x i associates with x j ), the trustworthiness of C (i.e. T(C)) is defined as the composition (i.e.
•) of the 1-to-1 trust relationships, i.e. ∀x i , x j ∈ C.
• t(x i , x j ) (notice that i can be equal to j, modeling an agent's trust in itself).
The • function has already been defined in [6] ; it models the composition of the 1-to-1 trust relationships. It can be used to consider also subjective ratings [18] (i.e. personal points of view on the composition), even if in this paper we will consider objective ratings [18] in order to easily represent and compute trust with a mathematical operator. For instance, some practical instantiations of the • function can be the arithmetic mean or the max operator: ∀x i , x j ∈ C. avg t(x i , x j ) or ∀x i , x j ∈ C. max t(x i , x j ). Notice that the • operation is not only a plain "addition" of the single trust values, but it must also take into account also the "added value" (or "subtracted value") derived from the combination effect.
As proposed in Section 4 for the classical problem, by changing the semiring structure we can represent different trust metrics [6, 22] . Therefore, the optimization of the set of coalitions can follow different principles, as, for example, minimizing a general cost of the aggregation or maximizing the "consistency" evaluation of the included entities, i.e. how much their interests are alike. In order to extend the stability condition of the classical problem, blocking coalitions are defined in Definition 2:
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a general soft constraint-based framework to represent and solve the Optimal Stable Marriage (OSM) problem [15] and its variants with incomplete preference lists or ties amongst preferences. The optimization criterion depends on the chosen semiring (e.g. Weighted or Fuzzy) which can be used to solved problems already proposed in literature, such as minimizing the egalitarian cost (see Section 3 and Section 4). Therefore, it is possible to solve all these different optimization problems with the same general framework, and we do not need an ad-hoc algorithm for each distinct case (e.g. [12, 15, 17] ). One of the aims of this paper was to relate the OSM and soft constraint satisfaction as done also for the classical SM and classic constraint satisfaction [10, 23] . Since many variants of the OSM problem are NP-hard [16] , representing and solving the problem as a SCSP can be a valuable strategy [10] . Integer linear programming, the tool adopted to find a solution for the related soft constraint problem, was applied here to this kind of problems for the first time.
Moreover, we have extended the OSM problem to achieve stable coalitions of agents/individuals by using trust metrics as a way to express preferences. Thus, we extend the stability conditions from agent-to-agent to agent-to-coalition (of agents); in this case the marriage is between an agent and a group of agents. What we obtain is a partition of the set of agents into trusted coalitions, such that no agent or coalition is interested in breaking the current relationships and consequently changing the partition. As future work, we would like to also use ILP to solve the problem extension to coalition formation, which has been modeled in Section 5.2. Moreover, we would like to compare the performance of the ILP framework with other classical SCSP solvers based on branch-andbound procedures [5, 20] .
It would be interesting try to extend the results of this paper by modeling the formation and the consequent behaviour of the other organizational paradigms presented in [14] , e.g. Holoarchies, Federations or Teams. To do so, we need to represent the different grouping relationships among the entities with soft constraints. We would like also to further explore the strong links between OSM and Games Theory, for example by developing even more sophisticated notions of stability.
